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1. Introduction
The impact of short-sale constraints on the capital market is highly controversial. There
is intense debate over whether such a constraint induces an upward bias in asset prices,
reduces price efficiency, and helps to stabilize the market (Miller, 1977; Diamond and Ver-
recchia, 1987; Hong and Stein, 2003). Since the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
temporarily banned short-selling in September 2008, the benefits and costs of this ban have
been under intense scrutiny. Discussions concerning margin requirements have attracted
the attention of governments, the investing public, and academia since the market crash of
October 1987. Margin-traders, as potentially informative speculators, are often blamed for
producing excess volatility and destabilizing the market.
Just as the Western developed markets imposed more stringent constraints on short-
selling and margin-trading, China launched a long-awaited pilot scheme on March 31, 2010,
allowing 90 constituent stocks on a designated list to be sold short and/or purchased on mar-
gin. This list was revised twice in 2010, and was then expanded to include 280 constituent
stocks and 7 exchange-traded-funds (ETFs) in December 2011. The China Securities Reg-
ulatory Committee (CSRC) then announced the successful completion of this pilot scheme
and made short-selling and margin-trading routine practice.
This event provides us with a rare opportunity to further investigate the impact of short-
selling and margin-trading from several aspects. First, the bans were lifted for a subset
of stocks overnight, allowing us to test whether short-sale constraints contribute to share
overvaluation by examining the event returns (Chang et al., 2007). Second, we explore the
influence of constraints on price efficiency by examining the changes in efficiency and volatil-
ity after the bans are lifted Bris et al. (2007). Third, China makes the daily short-selling,
margin-trading, and associated covering volume publicly available at the stock level. U.S. re-
searchers, in comparison, usually only observe the monthly short interest. We future examine
the relation between efficiency and short-selling/margin-trading activities using panel data
(Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). Finally, we analyze the relation between trading activity and
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the past and future stock returns (Diether et al., 2009), which enables us to infer the trading
motivations and assess the informativeness of Chinese short-sellers and margin-traders.
Our main results are as follows. First, we examine the stock returns around the event
day when a stock is added to the designated list and hence the bans on short-selling and
margin-trading are lifted. We find an average abnormal return of −47 bps on the event day,
which is significantly negative. The cumulative abnormal returns remain negative for two
months following the event. The evidence strongly supports the conjecture that short-sale
constraints contribute to overvaluation.
Second, we obtain the weekly returns over the one-year period before and after the
event and estimate efficiency measures. The results show that after the bans are lifted, stock
return synchronicity, the correlation between stock return and lagged market return, and the
variance ratio all reduce significantly in the down markets, yet there’s no significant change
in these measures in up markets. These pieces of evidence indicate that short-selling and/or
margin-trading help to promote price efficiency, especially during market downturns. We
then investigate the change in the distributions of weekly returns. After the bans are lifted,
we find significantly lower return volatility in both up- and down-market, and less occurrence
of extreme stock returns. This contradicts the traditional wisdom that short-sellers and/or
margin-traders destabilize the market.
Third, we utilize the panel data on short-selling and margin-trading activities to examine
the impact of these activities on price efficiency. We find that short-selling activities are
associated with lower down-market R2 and lower up-market cross-correlation (ρ+). The
covering of short positions is also associated with lower ρ+. The results imply that the
trades of short-sellers help to improve stock price efficiency. Margin traders’ contribution to
price efficiency, however, is mixed. Whereas margin-trading turnover is negatively associated
with ρ−, ρ+, and variance ratio, intensified covering of margin position is associated with
higher R2−, higher R
2
+, and higher ρ+. Overall, the purchase decision of margin-traders
increases price efficiency, whereas their sell decisions reduces efficiency. Besides, we find no
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evidence that short-selling and/or margin-trading destabilize the market. Intensified covering
of short positions and intensified margin-trading turnover are even associated with lower
return volatility in both down- and up-market, and these trading activities are associated
with a lower fraction of extremely negative returns.
Fourth, we utilize panel data on daily short-selling and margin-trading turnovers at stock
level to infer the trading motivations and assess the informativeness of Chinese short-sellers
and margin-traders. We find intensified short-selling activities in case of low historical return
and high contemporaneous return, indicating “arbitrage” activity against very short-term
price rebound in an established downward trend. Intensified short-selling has no observable
association with buy-order imbalance, refuting the alternative trading motivation of liquidity
provision. Intensified short-selling is accompanied by less sell-order imbalance, suggesting
that the trading strategies adopted short-sellers differ a lot from other typical sellers. In
addition, intensified short-selling accompanies higher intraday volatility and higher spread,
which hints that short-sellers are potentially informative. In brief, we find that short-sellers
trade on temporal overpricing in an downward trend. In comparison, margin-trading and
associated covering turnover show no identifiable relation with historical returns. We find
some obscure evidence that margin-traders buy underpriced stocks but the covering of short
positions seems not to be triggered by the reversal of underpricing. We also find evidence
that margin-traders provide liquidity to stocks with strong sell-order imbalance, but we find
intensified covering of margin positions accompanying both subsided sell- and buy-order
imbalance. Further investigation reveals that the sell-order imbalance is rather persistent,
and intensified margin-trading tends to be followed by even stronger sell-order imbalance,
indicating that the liquidity provision by margin-trader is not profitable.
We then explore whether trades by short-sellers or margin-traders predict future stock
returns. Surprisingly, we find that short-sale marginally predicts future returns over up to
five trading days, and the covering of short positions has very strong return predictive power
even over 20 trading days ahead. Margin-trades, however, have no return predictive power
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in the observation window. These pieces of evidence suggest that short-sellers possess the
ability to identify the temporal price rebound in a downward trend. Margin-traders, as a
group, do not have such an ability.
Finally, utilizing intraday transaction data, we categorize trades into small, middle, and
large trades according to the average dollar volume. Short-sellers tend to trade in large size,
and they trade opposite to middle-size trades. Margin-trades do not fall into any specific size
category, but we observe that margin-traders also trade opposite to middle-size trade. This
could help to explain why short-sellers and margin-traders do not add to return volatility.
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we add evidence on
the impact of short-selling and margin-trading constraints on the market. Second, to our
best knowledge, we are the first to comprehensively examine the impact of short-selling
and margin-trading on price efficiency in the Chinese market. Third, we are the first to
exploring the trading strategies adopted by Chinese short-sellers and margin-traders. This
study potentially helps market participants to understand why, when, and how those special
investors trade. The findings in this study provide important policy suggestions to Chinese
regulators. The Chinese capital market experienced burgeoning growth in the last two
decades, and is now one of the most important financial markets in the world. Chinese
regulators try to lift restrictions on the financial market whereas they are still concerned
the market stability. Our results suggest that due to the special trading strategy adopted,
Chinese short-sellers and/or margin-traders do not destabilize the market. China began
the pilot scheme of “refinancing” in August 2012, allowing banks, funds, and insurance
company to lend out money to margin-traders, contributing to the soaring volume of margin-
trading. “Security refinancing”, however, was shelved for stability concerns, greatly limiting
the supply of security lending. Our study reveals that short-selling, not margin-trading,
promotes price efficiency. In addition, short-sellers, not margin-traders, are the information
producers. We thus urge Chinese regulators to speed up the security refinancing scheme to
facilitate the further development of the market.
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2. Literature review
An investor buys a stock if she has a piece of good news about the underlying firm. If
the news is extraordinarily positive with a high precision, then she may build up a leveraged
position by borrowing money from the broker (margin-trading) or from other resources.
However, she has difficulties in selling the stock short if she has a piece of bad news. Short-
selling, the trading activity of selling a borrowed stock without owning it, may be prohibited
by law in certain countries, not practiced due to a lack of stock lenders or high security-
lending fees, or temporarily infeasible due to the up-tick rule (Bris et al., 2007). The short-
sale constraint is arguably more binding than the margin-trading constraint.
2.1. Short-sale constraints and overvaluation
Miller’s (1977) seminal model predicts overvaluation associated with the short-sale con-
straint, as pessimistic investors who do not originally own the stock are prevented from
trading. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), by contrast, predict no overvaluation, as investors
have already taken this constraint into account in a rational-expectation framework. Empir-
ical studies largely support the overvaluation view (Autore et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2007;
Chen et al., 2002). For example, Chang et al. (2007) take advantage of the institutional
setting in Hong Kong, in which only stocks on a pilot list can be sold short. As the list is
routinely revised at around quarterly intervals, the authors identify a series of events in which
the short-selling ban is lifted or imposed overnight for a subset of stocks. Negative event
returns upon the lifting of the short-sale ban strongly supports the overvaluation hypothesis.
2.2. Short-sale constraints, price efficiency, and market stabilization
Another stream of literature studies the impact of the short-sale constraint on price
efficiency. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that the constraint hinders price discovery,
especially for negative information. Bris et al. (2007) provide supporting evidence from an
international comparison between markets with different institutional settings concerning
short-sale constraints. They separately estimate the market model conditional on signed
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market returns, and use the down- minus up-market R2 to measure the efficiency loss induced
by the short-sale constraint. An alternative efficiency measure is the cross-autocorrelation
between stock returns and signed lagged market returns. Based on these two efficiency
measures, the authors find that in countries where short-selling is allowed and practiced,
prices incorporate negative information more efficiently, supporting Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987). In the same spirit, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) adopt cross-autocorrelation, a delay
measure (Hou and Moskowitz, 2005), and the variance ratio to measure efficiency. They
utilize a proprietary data on stock lending and loan fees from 26 countries and find lower
efficiency for stocks with more binding short-sale constraint. Consistently, Chen and Rhee
(2010) document faster speed of price adjustment for shortable stocks than for non-shortable
stocks in Hong Kong by autoregressive (VAR) model.
Since the disastrous 2007-09 crisis and the consequent U.S. short-sale ban in Septem-
ber 2008, the market stabilization function of the short-sale constraint has been even more
contentious. According to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, “the emergency order temporar-
ily banning short selling of financial stocks will restore equilibrium to markets.” A similar
ban was imposed in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain in 2011. The stabilization function
played by the short-sale constraint, however, is highly controversial. In support of the mar-
ket stabilization function, Xu (2007) develops a model based on investors who “agree to
disagree on the precision of a publicly observed signal”, and predicts increasing skewness
under the short-sale constraint. In contrast, based on the slow adjustment to negative news,
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict more negatively skewed returns under the short-sale
constraint. Hong and Stein’s (2003) model suggests that due to the short-sale constraint,
investors with negative information are sidelined from the market until the market drops
when “accumulated hidden (negative) information comes out,” which further exacerbates
the crash, and thus the returns are more negatively skewed. The empirical results are also
mixed. Bris et al. (2007) find that in countries where short-selling is not allowed or practiced,
stock returns are less negatively skewed, supporting the stabilization function played by the
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short-sale constraint. Consistently, Chang et al. (2007) document increased volatility, lower
skewness, and more occurrence of extremely negative returns after the short-sale ban is lifted
in Hong Kong. In contrast, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) find that relaxing the constraint is
not associated with increased volatility or more occurrence of negative returns, which does
not support the stabilization function. In the same spirit, Boehmer et al. (2013) find that
the U.S short-sale ban in September 2008, which was intended to stabilize the turbulent
capital markets, failed to support prices. Furthermore, the ban has side-effects by ruining
liquidity, slowing down price discovery, and hindering market-making for options.
2.3. Short-selling activity and returns
Despite ample vivid stories about “evil” short-sellers’ wrongdoings in the long finance
history (Bris et al., 2007), there is still hot debate over the relation between short-selling
and past/subsequent returns. Knowledge about short-sellers’ trading motivation, strategy,
or profitability is also incomplete. Data is the greatest limitation. The commonly used data
in U.S. are the monthly short-selling interest (Figlewski, 1981; Karpoff and Lou, 2010, among
others). Distinct from the short volume, which is the number of shares sold short during the
period, the short interest is the open short positions not covered at the end of the period.
Rare intra-day short-selling data were available in U.S. from January 1, 2005 to August 6,
2007, released in the implementation of a regulated SHO pilot scheme (Diether et al., 2009).
This precious data set, however, was no longer updated after this scheme ended in 2007.
Some researchers are able to obtain proprietary data at the daily frequency or at transaction
level, even with some clues to the identity of traders (Boehmer et al., 2008; Cohen et al.,
2007, to name a few). Unfortunately, the proprietary data are not publicly available to other
researchers.
Diether et al. (2009) investigate the short-term relation between short-selling and returns
using regulated SHO data at the transaction level. They find higher short-selling volume
following positive returns and before negative returns, and that short-selling positively pre-
dicts future returns over the five-trading day horizon. Takahashi (2010) uses Japanese stock
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lending data and finds that the most heavily shorted stocks underperform the least heavily
shorted stocks for up to three months.
The above-mentioned findings raise the question of why short-sellers are able to predict
future returns. Diether et al. (2009) propose four alternative explanations. First, short-sellers
may possess inside information, especially negative private information. Several studies
support this view (Boehmer et al., 2008; Karpoff and Lou, 2010). For example, Karpoff and
Lou (2010) document increased short-selling at least one year before a financial misconduct is
publicly revealed. Second, short-sellers are likely to be sophisticated investors, who are more
capable of identifying overpriced stocks. In support of this view, Boehmer et al. (2008) report
that 74% of short-selling orders are executed by institutions, and less than 2% are execute by
individual investors. Third, short-sellers may voluntarily provide liquidity by selling short
in temporary buying-order imbalance. Once this order imbalance subsides, prices drop back
to their fundamental values. Short-sellers then cover the short position at a profit. Fourth,
short-sellers may be speculators in voluntarily bearing more risk during high uncertainty.
If high uncertainty comes from information asymmetry, more short-selling should coincide
with high bid-ask spread, which falls after the information gets public. If high uncertainty
comes from divergent opinions, more short-selling should coincide with lower spread because
of competitive orders, and the spread widens after opinions converge.
In this study, we utilize the Chinese daily short-selling volume and covering of short
positions at stock level to investigate the relation between short-selling activity and returns.
As one of the most important developing markets, the Chinese stock market is known for
investors’ “irrationality”. We are thus curious to know the nature of Chinese short-sellers
and margin-traders, their trading strategy, whether they are profitable, and whether their
trades contribute to market efficiency and/or destabilize the market. 4
4This study is complementary to Sharif et al. (2012a,b). Sharif et al. (2012b) investigate the market reac-
tion to the addition event of the first batch of 90 stocks to the designated list in March 2010 in China. They
find negative abnormal returns on both the announcement and implementation days, supporting Miller’s
(1977) overvaluation hypothesis. They also find lower trading volume following the lifting of the bans, and
argue that uninformed investors choose not to participate to avoid trading against informative short-sellers,
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2.4. Margin-trading
Margin-trading allows investors to construct a leveraged long position by borrowing cap-
ital from registered security companies. Both short-selling and margin-trading were strictly
prohibited in China before March 2010. However, the ban on margin-trading was arguably
less binding, as investors could easily circumvent this constraint by borrowing from various
other resources, and “home-make” leveraged positions even without margin requirements.
In addition, if a sufficient number of investors participate in the market, the ban on margin-
trading cannot hinder the discovery of positive information.
Traditional wisdom suggests that margin-traders, as potential speculators, trade to desta-
bilize the market. After the market crash in October 1987, regulatory bodies tend to propose
more stringent margin requirements to intimidate speculators. Chowdhry and Nanda (1998),
however, develop a model that predicts increased market instability brought on by the mar-
gin requirements themselves. Since the security purchased on margin serves as the collateral,
random fluctuation in stock prices may result in forced liquidation if the margin requirement
is rigid enough, leading to excess volatility. Empirical evidence is mixed. Seguin (1990) inves-
tigates the inception of the margin-trading for OTC stocks, finding positive event returns,
no higher volatility, improved liquidity, and increased price informativeness. In compari-
son, Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) examine stock returns and volatility after margin
requirement changes in Japan. They find that after the implementation of higher margin
requirement, returns tend to be lower and volatility drops, indicating that a higher margin
requirement deters destabilizing speculators and does not incur market instability. Hirose
et al. (2009) examine weekly data on Japanese margin-trading and short-selling. Interest-
ingly, they find that although the margin-trading is dominated by retail investors, who are
presumably uninformed, their margin-trading positively predicts future returns, especially
for small firms.
which leads to reduced market quality. Sharif et al. (2012a) find an increased quoted spread after the lifting
of the bans for the 90 stocks, consistent with the non-participation story by uninformed investors.
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3. Market reactions
3.1. Institutional background
Short-selling or margin-trading were prohibited in the Chinese security market before
the implementation of the pilot scheme in March 2010. Table 1 shows the timeline of this
influential reform. On March 31, 2010, the two major exchanges in mainland China allowed
“qualified” investors to buy eligible stocks on margin or short-sell those stocks under a pilot
scheme. In total, 90 constituent stocks in the SSE 50 Index (on the Shanghai exchange) and
SZSE Component Index (on the Shenzhen exchange) on a designated list were eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling. This list was revised twice in 2010, with six stocks being
deleted and six new stocks being added in July 2010. On December 5, 2011, the exchanges
substantially expanded the list to include 278 qualified constituent stocks in the SSE 180
Index and SZSE 100 Index, as well as 7 exchange-traded-funds (ETFs). The CSRC then
announced that the pilot scheme would become a routine practice and accordingly revised
the detailed implementation rules to stipulate more specific margin requirements.
Stocks and ETFs have to meet several criteria to be eligible for short-selling and margin-
trading. According to the implementation rules promulgated by the Shanghai exchange,
eligible stocks must satisfy size, liquidity, and volatility requirements.5 According to the
administrative rules promulgated by the CSRC, only “qualified” investors can buy stocks
on margin or sell stocks short, and the requirements differ across security companies.6 It
5Source: http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/sserules/sseruler20111125b.html.
First, to be eligible for margin-trading, a firm must have no less than 100 million tradable shares and a
public float no smaller than RMB 500 million (US$79.5 million). To be eligible for short-selling, a firm must
have no less than 200 million tradable shares and a public float no smaller than RMB 800 million (US$127.3
million). Second, the number of shareholders must be no less than 4,000. Third, in any given day during the
past three months on a rolling basis, the daily turnover must be no lower than 15% of index turnover, the
daily trading value must be no lower than RMB 50 million (US$7.95 million), its average return must not
deviate more than 4% from the index return, and its return volatility must be no higher than five times of the
index volatility. The middle exchange rate published by the People’s Bank of China was 6.2855 RMB/US$
on December 31, 2012. http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/17383
6Taking the guidance of Haitong Securities as an example, qualified investors must satisfy below require-
ments. First, an investor must have a trading history longer than one and a half years with that security
company (reduced to half a year after December 2011), with capital of no lower than RMB 500,000 (approxi-
mately US$ 79,500). The investor must demonstrate the basic knowledge by passing a professional knowledge
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seems that, similar to the practice in Japan and Taiwan, short-selling and margin-trading
business in China caters retail investors rather than institutions. The up-tick rule is strictly
implemented, and naked short-selling is strictly prohibited.
The cost of short-selling and margin-trading is quite high in China. For example, Haitong
Securities charge the same fee for security lending and margin-trading for all stocks: 3% above
the prime rate for 6-month loans, as the maturity of short- or margin-contract is no longer
than 6 months as stipulated by the CSRC. On December 31, 2012, the prime rate for 6-
month loans (published by The People’s Bank of China) was 5.60%. Thus, Haitong charged
8.60% for margin-trading and stock-lending. Huatai Securities, however, charged 8.60% for
margin-trading and 10.60% for security lending. By contrast, D’Avolio (2002) report that
the value-weighted loan fee of a sample portfolio is only .25% in U.S., and only 9% of stocks
have a loan fee above 1%. Even for stocks with high loan fees, the mean fee is only 4.3%.
The limited supply of security lending is also a problem. From March 2010 to August 2012,
qualified investors can borrow money or stock only from security companies. Beginning
from August 27, 2012, investors can also borrow money from investment banks, funds, and
insurance companies through a centralized refinancing company. Security lending, however,
is still limited to security companies only.
Margin-trading and short-selling are settled in a shared margin account. In the margin
calculation, the collateral value is the discounted value of stocks purchased on margin or
sold short, and the discount rate varies with the asset type and across individual stocks.
An investor must keep the balance at or above the maintenance level. The position will be
forced to close if she fails to meet the margin call within two trading days.
exam and a risk-attitude test. Other qualitative requirements include a good trading record, low bankruptcy
risk, and not being a corporate insider, etc. Source: http://www.htsec.com/htsec/Info/1930303.
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3.2. Data
We collect information on the designated stock list and revisions from the exchange web-
sites7. Data retrieved from the China Stock Market Trading Research (CSMAR) database
provided by GuoTaiAn (GTA) Company include (1) daily stock returns, (2) annual finan-
cial statements, and (3) high frequency trade and quote data. We obtain daily short-selling
volume, margin-trading volume, and respective covering volumes for eligible stocks from
WIND.
The sample period spans January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2012. We have 285 stock
addition events, 10 ETF addition events, and 7 deletion events in total. Due to the very
small sample, we drop the 7 deletion events. Due to the special features of ETFs and the
lack of trade and quote data, we drop the 10 addition events for ETFs. We are left with
285 addition events, among which 90 belong to the first batch added to the list on March
31, 2010, and 189 belongs to the second batch added on December 5, 2012. Among these
addition events, 4 stocks were added to the list twice, and the time interval is over one year
between the first and the second addition.
3.3. Event day returns
Following Chang et al. (2007), we calculate abnormal returns around addition events by
the market-model adjusted abnormal returns. An addition event is defined as one in which
an individual stock is added to the designated list and thus can be sold short and purchased
on margin from the event day, denoted as day 0. We apply the pre-event estimation window
of [−397,−31] days before the announcement date, with a minimum of 180 trading days.8
We estimate the OLS market model by regressing the time series of stock i’s daily returns
(Rit) on the market returns RMt: Rit = αi + βiRMt + it, where the market portfolio is
7http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/sjs/rzrq_home.shtml and http://www.szse.cn/main/
disclosure/rzrqxx/ywgg/.
8The pre-event window in Chang et al. (2007) is [-280,-31] event days relative to the effective day. In our
sample, the interval between the announcement day and effective day on which the scheme was implemented
was as long as 47 calendar days (34 trading days) for the first batch. We use the one-year estimation window
before announcement day to avoid potential contamination by the announcement events.
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the value-weighted return of all stocks traded on the A-share market, using the market
capitalization of the public float as the weight. After obtaining the estimated α and β for
each firm event, we calculate the market-model adjusted abnormal return ARmi (t) for stock
i at event day t as ARi(t) = Rit − αˆi − βˆiRMt. The cumulative abnormal return during the
event window [t1, t2] is calculated as CARi[t1, t2] =
∑t2
t=t1
ARi(t).
We have 274 firm-events with abnormal returns available on the event days. Table 2
reports the cross-sectional average of the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
by trading days around the addition events. In Panel A, we observe a significantly negative
abnormal return of −47 bps on day zero, the event day. Although the abnormal return is
significantly positive on day one, its average magnitude is much smaller than that on day
zero. In Panel B, CAR[−5,−1], the abnormal returns cumulated during the five trading
days before the event, is on average −71 bps, which is significantly negative. As the addition
event has been known by the public, selling activities in advance may push this early price
drop. CAR[0, 2] is on average −39 bps, which is significantly negative, and CAR[0, 5] is
on average −85 bps, which is also significantly negative. The average cumulative abnormal
return remains significantly negative up to 40 trading days after the addition event. Figure
1 plots the cross-sectional average of AR[t] and CAR[−5, t] during the window of [−5,+25]
trading days relative to the event. We find negative ARs in most days, and an obvious
downward trend in CAR throughout the window. This pattern seems persistent and is not
followed by evident reversal, consistent with the results in Table 2.9
In summary, stock returns upon the implementation of short-selling and margin-trading
tend to be negative, consistent with the findings in Sharif et al. (2012b) who examine the
returns for a subset of 90 addition events in the first batch on March 31, 2010. The results
confirm our conjecture that, although both short-selling and margin-trading were banned
before the event, the constraint on short-selling was more binding. Hence, upon the lifting
9The initiation of index futures trading was an another influential reform during the period. CSRC
announced the plan on February 20, 2010 and the trading of index futures began on April 16, 2010, which
is 11 trading days after the initiation of short-selling and margin-trading on March 31, 2010.
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of the bans, the overvaluation caused by short-selling bans lead to the documented price
drop, supporting Miller (1977).
3.4. Change in price efficiency
Next, we examine whether the short-selling and margin-trading constraints hinder price
discovery by examining the change in efficiency around the addition events. We obtain
weekly returns during 56 weeks before and after the addition events and apply an pre-event
window of [−56,−5] weeks and an post-event window of [5, 56] relative to the event week
to estimate efficiency measures. We winsorize stock returns falling out of three standard
deviations around the mean. First, following Bris et al. (2007), we estimate the OLS market
model separately in the pre-event and post-event estimation windows for each stock to get β
and R2. Higher β indicates greater sensitivity of stock returns to market returns, and lower
R2 indicates higher efficiency as more firm-specific information is incorporate into prices.
We also estimate the market model separately conditional on negative (positive) market
returns, and denote the beta coefficient as β− (β+) and R-square as R2− (R
2
+). Second, we
estimate the cross-autocorrelation ρ between stock returns and the lagged market returns,
conditional on signed lagged market returns. Higher ρ indicates a greater price delay and
thus lower efficiency. Third, following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we estimate the variance
ratio (|VR|) in a rolling way, defined as the absolute value of the variance of monthly returns
divided by four times the variance of weekly returns, minus one. Higher |VR| indicates lower
efficiency, as the return process deviates more from a random walk.10 We require a minimum
of 36 weeks in each estimation window to calculate the efficiency measures, and a minimum
of 16 weeks to calculate signed β, R2, and ρ. We then perform paired t-test to examine the
change in efficiency measures around the addition events.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the comparison results. We find that the down-market β− in-
creases significantly after the bans are lifted, indicating that stock returns are more sensitive
10According to Hou and Moskowitz (2005), the D1 and D2 used in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) as efficiency
measures are quite noisy at individual stock level. Therefore we abandon this efficiency measure.
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to negative information. Consistently, the down-market R2− significantly drops after bans
are lifted, suggesting more firm-specific information incorporated into stock price and thus
greater efficiency. Both |ρ−| and |ρ+| drops significantly after the bans are lifted. Specifically,
|ρ−| drops from an average of 23.1% to 14.5%, and this drop is also economically significant.
|VR| also drops significantly. All these pieces of evidences reveal greater price efficiency after
short-selling and margin-trading are allowed. The asymmetrically improved efficiency in the
down-market hints that it is the short-selling constraint that hinders price discovery, and it
is short-selling activities that contribute to greater efficiency.
3.5. Change in return distributions
We next utilize the weekly returns during the pre-event and post-event estimation window
to investigate the change in return distributions (Chang et al., 2007; Bris et al., 2007). Dif-
ferent from section 3.4, we do not winsorize weekly stock returns here. We obtain volatility,
skewness, and kurtosis of weekly returns. Conditional on the sign of weekly stock returns,
we calculate the standard deviation of max(Reti, 0) as up-side volatility (Vol+), and the
standard deviation of min(Reti, 0) as down-side volatility (Vol−). Extreme− (Extreme+) is
the occurrence of extremely negative (positive) returns, calculated as the fraction of weeks
in which returns are two standard deviations below (above) the average for each stock. If
bans on short-selling and margin-trading stabilize the market, and/or the trades by short-
sellers or margin-traders destabilize the market, we expect to observe higher volatility, lower
skewness, and higher occurrence of extreme returns after the bans are lifted.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the comparison results. Contrary to the stabilization role
played by constraints, however, we observe lower down-side and up-side volatility, higher
skewness, and lower occurrence of both extremely positive and negative returns. Such re-
sults show that the trades by Chinese short-seller and margin-traders do not destabilize the
market. This evidence somehow contradicts the U.S. evidence (Bris et al., 2007) and Hong
Kong evidence (Chang et al., 2007), but is consistent with the international evidence from
Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011). We will discuss the potential reasons in the cross-sectional tests
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in section 5.2.
4. Short-selling and margin-trading activities
As we discuss in section 2.3, China makes the panel data on daily short-selling and
margin-trading volume publicly available, which is a precious dataset allowing us to do
many cross-sectional test. In this section, we further investigate the impact of short-selling
and margin-trading constraints by examining the relation between trading activities and
efficiency measures.
4.1. Summary statistics
We report the summary statistics for short-selling, margin-trading, and covering activities
in Table 4. Panel A shows the statistics for short-selling and related covering activities, and
Panel B shows the statistics for margin-trading and related covering activities. The two
panels clearly show that short-selling and margin-trading are becoming more popular. For
example, the average daily short volume as a percentage of daily trading volume is only
.01% in 2010, and this ratio grows to .73% in 2012. Margin-trading is more popular than
short-selling. The average daily margin volume as a percentage of trading volume is .78%
in 2010, and this ratio grows to 5.15% in 2012. Several facts may contribute to this trend.
First, the security lending fee for short-selling is no lower than the interest charge for margin-
trading. Second, the supply of security lending in short-selling is relatively more limited than
supply of capital in margin-trading, especially after the refinancing mechanism implemented
in August 2012. Third, the up-tick rule adds to the difficulties of short-selling. Fourth, due
to the unlimited potential losses, short-selling itself is riskier than margin-trading. Finally,
as Chinese investors are new to the short-selling mechanism, it is not surprising that many
of them choose to steer clear of short-selling. All these facts suggest that the barriers to
entry for short-selling are higher than those for margin-trading.
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4.2. Impact of trading activities on efficiency and return distribution
Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we estimate the yearly efficiency measures from
weekly returns for each stock. Then we obtain the yearly average of daily short-selling
or margin-trading turnover and associated covering for each stock. Turnovers are defined
as the daily short/margin/covering volume scaled by daily total trading volume. After
aggregated to year level, covering of short (margin) turnover is extremely highly correlated
with short (margin) turnover itself. To deal with multicollinearity, we regress yearly covering
of short (margin) turnover on short (margin) turnover and take the residual as orthogonalized
covering turnover. Utilizing this panel data, we regress efficiency and volatility measures on
trading activities to investigate the impact of short-selling and margin-trading activities.
Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we also control for log firm size, yearly turnover
ratio, dummy variables for dual-listed A-H stocks and A-B stocks. The coefficients on those
control variables are not reported for brevity. Following (Thompson, 2011), we use the
standard errors clustered by stock and year to deal with potential serial correlation and
cross correlation.
Table 5 shows the regression results. In panel A we find that intensified short-selling
activity is associated with lower R2 conditional on negative market returns, indicating more
firm-specific bad news incorporated into stock prices accompanying more short-selling. Both
intensified short-selling and covering activities are associated with lower cross-correlation.
These two pieces of evidence suggest greater price efficiency associated with intensified short-
selling activities. It is confusing why short-selling and associated covering activities are
associated with reduced cross-correlation conditional on positive lagged market return. In
the section 5.1, we will explore the trading strategies deployed by short-sellers in greater
details. The contribution by margin-trading activities, however, is mixed. We discover that
intensified margin-trading activities are associated with higher price efficiency, indicated by
lower cross-correlation conditional on both negative and positive lagged market returns and
lower variance ratio. Intensified covering activities of short positions, however, are associated
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with lower efficiency, indicated by significantly higher R2 in both up- and down market, and
marginally higher cross-correlation in the up-market.
The impact on return distribution is straightforward. Panel B of Table 3 clearly shows
that intensified buying activities, induced by both covering of short positions and margin-
trading, are associated with lower up- and down-side volatility and less occurrence of ex-
tremely negative returns. Even the selling activity induced by covering of margin positions
is associated with less occurrence of extremely negative returns. Such evidence contradicts
the conventional wisdoms that short-sellers and margin-traders speculate on their private
information and destabilize the market.
5. Short-selling, margin-trading, past return, and future returns
5.1. Trading strategies adopted by short-sellers
Next, by utilizing the daily trading activities by short-sellers and margin-traders, we try
to infer the trading strategies deployed by Chinese traders.
Diether et al. (2009) document that U.S. short-sellers are able to identify overpricing
by short-selling stocks with high historical return and high contemporaneous return. Ac-
cordingly, we regress the stock-level short-selling turnover (Shortt) on the cumulative stock
return over the past five trading days (r−5,−1) and the contemporaneous return (rt). If Chi-
nese short-sellers adopt the same tradings strategy as their U.S. counterpart, the coefficient
on r−5,−1 and rt are expected to be positive. As the result of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test rejects the existence of a unit root in the series of daily short turnover, we control for
Shortt−1 in the panel regressions. We use the standard errors clustered by stock and date.
We report the regression results in column (1) of Table 6. In sharp contrast to the
findings by Diether et al. (2009), we find a significantly negative coefficient on r−5,−1. The
coefficient on rt, however, is significantly positive, and the magnitude of the coefficient on rt
is greater than that on r−5,−1, consistent with Diether et al. (2009). These coefficients imply
that a −10% return in the past 5 days increases the short-selling turnover by .03%, whereas
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a 10% contemporaneous return increases the short-selling turnover by .09%. In comparison,
the average daily short turnover in 2012 is just .73% (Table 4). These results suggest that
Chinese short-sellers also arbitrage against overpricing. Such overpricing, however, is a very
temporal price rebound after low returns in the past week. They seem to believe in the
persistence of the trend. The positive return following a downward trend, therefore, is
believed to be temporal and will reverse very soon. The causal relation between rt and
shortt cannot be argued in the other way, as short-selling leads to negative price impact and
hence predicts a negative coefficient on rt.
An alternative trading motivation is that traders voluntarily provide liquidity by short-
selling in temporal buy-order imbalance and recover the position in reversed buy-imbalance.
Oimb, the order imbalance, is the difference between daily buy volume and sell volume, scaled
by daily total volume. Sell-order imbalance Oimb−(buy-order imbalance Oimb+) is |Oimb|
if Oimb < 0(> 0) and zero otherwise. We follow the buy-sell indicator provided by GTA.
It is noted that the short-selling and margin-trading volume are included in the transaction
data in calculating the buy/sell imbalance. Table 6 shows no evidence supporting liquidity
provision, as short-selling turnover has no observable relation with the buy-order imbalance.
Short-selling turnover is negatively associated with the sell-order imbalance. Taking into
consideration that the short-selling is included in sell volume, it seems that the trading
pattern by short-sellers are quite different from other typical sellers.
To examine the opportunistic risk-bearing hypothesis, we use daily volatility (σ), defined
as day high minus day low, scaled by day high. To discriminate between the information
asymmetry and divergence opinions, we use Spread, the volume-weighted average of the
effective spreads on a day. Column (1) of Table 6 show that intensified short-selling is
accompanied by higher intraday volatility and higher bid-ask spread, indicating risk-bearing
in increased uncertainty induced by information asymmetry. Such result hints that short-
sellers are likely to be informed traders.
Other control variables unreported for brevity include the lagged dependent variable,
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the average share turnover in the past five trading days, the average sell- and buy-order
imbalance in the past five trading days, the average σ in the past five trading days, the log
firm size, and book-to-market ratio.
Column (2) of Table 6 reports the regression results with CoverShort as the dependent
variable. The negative coefficient on r−5,−1 suggests that the duration of this short position
is quite likely to be short. The negative coefficient on rt suggests that short-sellers cover
the short positions after the “temporal” overpricing is reversed. The covering behavioral
also suggests a contrarian view. To maximize the profit of the short positions, short-sellers
hold the short position following a downward trend until the overturn and the upward trend
begins. Next, we observe negative relation between covering of short positions and the buy
and sell-order imbalance. It seems that the buy decisions by short-sellers where made on a
day when the buy-sell pressure is relatively balanced. The buy decisions are also accompanied
by increased volatility induced by increased information asymmetry, suggesting that the buy
decisions by short-sellers are likely to be informed.
To conclude, Chinese short-sellers they trade on very short-term overpricing by short-
selling in response to a positive return following negative historical returns, and cover the
short positions after overpricing is reversed. They seem to hold the belief that the past trend
will continue, and the rebound following a downward trend shall be temporal and reverse
very soon. Short-sellers are momentum trader when establishing their short positions and
contrarian when covering the short positions. Short-sellers do not provide liquidity in buy-
order imbalance. Intensified short-selling is accompanied by higher uncertainty and higher
information asymmetry, suggesting short-sellers to be informative traders. Overall,
5.2. Trading strategies adopted by margin-traders
Following the methodology used in the previous section, we propose below motivations
for margin-trading. First, margin-traders possess private positive information. Second, they
have better skill to identify undervalued stocks. Third, they provide liquidity by buying
stock on margin when there is a temporary sell-order imbalance. Fourth, they speculate
21
in increased uncertainty. We examine these trading motivations using panel regressions by
regressing daily margin-trading turnover on historical and contemporaneous returns.
The regression results are reported in column (3) of Table 6. First, the coefficient on r−5,−1
is indistinguishable from zero in column (3), suggesting no relation between margin-trading
and historical returns. The coefficient on rt, however, is significantly negative, suggesting a
contrarian strategy adopted by margin-traders by buying underperformed stock. This shows
that margin-traders do not trade on momentum, but on temporal underpricing. Interestingly,
we find intensified margin-trading in strong sell-order imbalance and attenuated margin-
trading in strong buy-order imbalance. This is consistent with liquidity provision, and it
also suggests that margin-traders take opposite position to other investor groups. Therefore,
it is not surprising to observe a negative coefficient on σt, indicating reduced volatility
accompanying intensified margin-trading activities, consistent with the findings in Table
5. Besides, intensified margin-trading is associated with greater spread, suggesting more
informative trades by either margin-trader or their opposite sellers.
In column (4), we find no relation between covering of margin-positions and historical
returns either, and a marginally negative relation between covering of margin positions and
rt. This is quite surprising. If margin-traders buy to arbitrage very short-term underpricing,
we shall observe intensified covering of margin positions following positive returns, which is
not found. Hence, we reject the underpricing hypothesis as a potential trading motivation for
margin-traders. If margin-traders buy to provide liquidity in sell-order imbalance, we shall
observe intensified covering of margin positions accompanying subsided sell-order imbalance
or stronger buy-order imbalance, and thus expect a negative coefficient on oimb− and a
positive coefficient on oimb+. However, we observe significantly negative coefficients on both
oimb+ and oimb−. It seems that, like the covering of short positions, the covering of margin
positions intensifies on a day with balanced buy-sell pressure. Hence, the support to the
liquidity provision hypothesis is quite obscure.
To sum up, Chinese margin-traders do not trade on momentum or on underpricing.
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They buy opposite to strong selling pressure, but we find no sufficient evidence that they
intentionally provide liquidity. By trading against other investors, intensified margin-trading
is associated with lower volatility.
5.3. Can short-sellers or margin-traders predict future returns?
In the previous two sections, we show that short-sellers believe in the trend and “arbi-
trage” away very short-term overpricing, and cover the short positions in response to negative
returns after overpricing is reversed. The trading pattern by margin-traders, however, show
no observation relation with historical returns. Although we seem to observe margin-trades
in response to very short-term underpricing or liquidity provision, the covering pattern is in-
consistent with either underpricing or liquidity provision hypotheses. If Chinese short-sellers
or margin-traders possess superior information or skills, their trades should predict future
returns. In other words, intensified short-selling should negatively predict future returns and
intensified margin-trading should positively predict future returns. Intensified covering of
short (margin) positions indicates a higher likelihood that the downward (upward) trend is
over and an upward (downward) trend is to begin and thus future returns should be higher
(lower). In this section, we examine whether the trades of short-sellers or margin-traders
predict future returns. Although we cannot match covering activity to their respective orig-
inal positions, we can still make a reasonable conjecture about whether trades are profitable
within a certain investment horizon.
Following Diether et al. (2009), we examine the return predictability using panel data
regression, with future abnormal returns as the dependent variable. We skip for one day
to eliminate the impact of bid-ask bounce, if there is any. The abnormal return is the
daily raw return minus the expected return from the market model. We estimate the OLS
market model with a rolling window of [−396,−31] calendar days with a minimum of 180
trading days. The key explanatory variables are the daily short turnover (Shortt), the
margin turnover (Margint), covering of the short turnover (Cover
Short
t ), and covering of the
margin turnover (CoverMargint ). Control variables include the cumulative stock return in
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the past five trading days, the contemporaneous stock return, the volume-weighted effective
spread, the contemporaneous buy/sell-order imbalance, and the intraday volatility. Some
other control variables unreported for brevity include the average share turnover in the past
five trading days, log firm size, and book-to-market ratio.
The regression results are reported in Table 7. On one-day forecast horizon, we find
that intensified short-selling on day t is associated with marginally lower future returns
on day t + 2, and that intensified covering of short positions on day t is associated with
significantly higher future returns on day t + 2. Intensified margin-trading and covering
turnover, however, do not have observable predictive power for future returns. It seems that
short-sellers, on aggregate, are informative; margin-trader, however, are not. The predictive
power of short-selling activity remains in one-week horizon, whereas the predictive power
of margin-trading remains very strong even in 20 trading days. Such evidence echos what
we found in previous. As the trades by short-sellers are informative, short-selling activities
increase the price efficiency (Tables 3 and 5). As margin-traders trade opposite to other
potentially informative sellers (Table 6), although they work to stabilize the market, their
trades do not contribute to price efficiency (Tables 3 and 5).
In the control variables part, r−5,−1 has a negative coefficient, and the explanatory power
of this historical return turns stronger in longer period. This evidence indicate that returns
in China tend to follow a short-term reversal. Higher spread predicts higher future return.
More buying pressure, however, predicts lower future return. Higher volatility and turnover
ratio predicts higher future return.
6. Further discussions
6.1. Technical indicators
Diether et al. (2009) find intensified short-selling activities following positive returns,
especially when the stock becomes a cross-sectional “winner”. Technical analysis is one of
the most popular “skills” adopted by both retail investors and institutions to identify a
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“trend” and design trading strategies in China. In this section, we explore whether technical
indicators explain or predict the short-selling and margin-trading activities.
Similar to Diether et al. (2009), we use two cross-sectional technical indicators. On each
day we rank all shortable stocks by r−5,−1, and the dummy Winner−5,−1 (Loser−5,−1) equals
one for stocks ranked in the top (bottom) quintile and zero otherwise. Similarly, we rank
stocks by rt and define Winnert and Losert.
Following Brock et al. (1992), we identify four time-series technical indicators according
to the moving average (MA) rule and the trading range breakout (TRB) rule. We assign
a dummy DownMA−1 that equals one if the stock price on day t − 1 drops and crosses over
the past 20-trading day’s moving average, which indicates an established downward trend
and is thus a sell signal, and zero otherwise. Similarly, UpMA−1 equals one if the price on day
t − 1 rises and crosses over the 20-day moving average, which is a buy signal. We assign a
dummy DownTRB−1 (Up
TRB
−1 ) that equals one if the stock price on day t− 1 drops (rises) and
penetrates the past 250-trading days’ minimum (maximum) and zero otherwise. Brock et al.
(1992) argue that TRB indicates a long-term trend being established and thus DownTRB is a
strong sell signal and UpTRB is a strong buy signal. Similarly, we define these four indicators
based on rt. In sum, we use two MA indicators, two TRB indicators, and Loser and Winner
dummies to predict/explain short-seller or margin-trader’s trading activity. Control variables
unreported for brevity include the lagged dependent variable, the contemporaneous bid-ask
spread, sell/buy order imbalance, σ, and the historical average turnover ratio, sell/buy order
imbalance, σ in the past five trading days, log firm size, and book-to-market ratio.
The regression results are reported in Table 8. In Panel A, the explanatory variables are
technical indicators based on historical returns. In Panel B, the explanatory variables are
technical indicators based on rt. As shown in column (1) of Panel A, short-sellers favor stocks
that are past losers, with historical prices drop below the short-term moving average, and/or
penetrate the 1-year minimum. In a word, they are searching for stocks with well established
downward trend. Besides, they avoid trading stocks with established upward trend, either
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in the short-term or long-term. Column (1) of Panel B shows that short sellers search for
very short-term overpricing in an established downward trend by short-selling stocks that
are currently winners but with prices drop and penetrate 1-year minimum. Such evidence
suggests that technical analysis is indeed a helpful tool to predict and explain short-sellers
trading strategies.
In column (2), we regress covering of short positions on technical indicators. Panel A
shows that the coefficients on technical indicators are largely similar to those in column (1),
except for rt, indicating that the decision to recover the short positions is triggered by the
contemporaneous return. In panel B, we observe that covering of short positions happens
for stocks that are either concurrent winner or losers. The positive coefficient on losert is
consistent with the results in Table 6, suggesting covering of short positions after overpricing
disappears. The positive coefficient on winnert, however, might suggest closure of short
positions to stop loss for cross-sectional winners. Negative coefficients on upMAt and up
TRB
t ,
however, indicate that losses incurred in short positions do not result in forced closures of
short positions.
The margin-traders rely less on technical analysis. Consistent with what we find in Table
6, they do not trade on momentum. From column (3) of panel A, however, we can tell that
margin-traders avoid trading stocks with prices breaking out the 1-year minimum. Panel B
shows that margin-traders favor concurrent losers, which is consistent with the very short-
term contrarian strategy observed in Table 6. Consistently, they avoid trading stocks that
are concurrent winner, and/or stocks with short-term upward trend or long-term downward
trend. And, they do not cover margin positions for contemporaneous winners or lowers.
Combined with the positive coefficient on rt in column (4) of panel A, we can safely reject
the underpricing hypothesis as a trading motivation.
To sum up, we find evidence that Chinese short-sellers use technical analysis. Specifically,
they search for stocks in an established downward trend but show a contemporary positive
return. They appear to follow both cross-sectional and time-series technical indicators to
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identify trends. Margin-traders, however, do not rely on technical analysis so much as short-
sellers. Margin-traders do not identify trend. Instead, they try to capture very short-term
underpricing, and we find no evidence that they successfully do so at a profit.
6.2. The identity of Chinese short-sellers and margin-traders
Who are those short-sellers and margin-traders? Are they retail investors, wealthy indi-
viduals, or institutions? Based on transaction data, we form our best conjecture concerning
their identity.
We collect 5-second transaction data from GTA. For records with non-zero trading vol-
ume, we obtain the average dollar size by dividing the trading volume by the number of
trades in this 5-second. Since the number of trades data are only available for stocks traded
on the Shenzhen exchange, the results reported in this subsection only cover a subsample
of all shortable/marginable stocks. Following Ng and Wu (2007), we label trades with an
average dollar size below RMB 10,000 as small orders, trades with an average dollar size
greater than or equal to RMB 10,000 and below RMB 50,000 as median orders, and trades
with an average dollar size greater than or equal to RMB 50,000 as large orders. It is highly
likely that small trades are submitted by retail investors, whereas large trades are submitted
by institutions or wealthy individuals. In addition, we follow the buy/sell indicator provided
by GTA to categorize trades to buyer- or seller-initiated.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the summary statistics of trades. About 65% trades are of a
middle size, and these trades contribute to about 65% of trade value. Although small buy
and sell orders contribute to about 30% of trades, the value of trades is no more than 10%.
In contrast, although large buy and sell orders contribute to only 6% of trades, the value of
these trades is about 27% of trade value. Panel B shows the relation between excess buy/sell
and past/conterminous returns. We follow Ng and Wu (2007) to define daily excess large buy
as max[(large buy - large sell)/(large buy + large sell),0], adjusted by the average excess large
buy of all available stocks on day t. We define excess buy/sell from other investor groups in
a similar way. In column (1) of panel B, we regress excess large buy on r−5,−1 and rt. It is
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obvious that large buy-order increases as the historical return and contemporaneous return
are lower, suggesting a contrarian strategy adopted by traders submitting large orders, who
are likely to be institutions or wealthy individuals. Column (2) shows no observable pattern
between the sell decision and returns for investors who submit large orders. Column (3)
reveals that either investors submitting middle-size orders trade on positive returns, or their
trades result in a contemporary positive return. Columns (4) and (6) suggest that small
and middle-size sell orders are contrarian traders: they sell stocks with positive historical
returns. By comparing these results to Table 6, it seems that the trading strategy deployed
by Chinese short-sellers or margin-traders are quite unique, since their trading pattens are
not consistent with any typical investor groups identified here.
In panel C, we regress trading activities by short-sellers or margin-traders on the buy or
sell from typical investors groups to examine any similarity between them. In the first row
of panel C, we regress the daily short turnover on excess large/small buy/sell. Note that
the short volume is included in the calculation of excess sell, and higher short turnover leads
to greater selling pressure by construction. The positive association between short turnover
and large sell-orders indicates that short-sellers are more likely to submit large sell-order.
However, they trade contrarian to investors who submit middle-size orders. The covering
of short positions has a very noisy pattern, and it increases in large sell and decreases in
middle-size buy and sell-orders. We do not find margin-trader trade in a way consistent with
any typical investor groups. However, margin-trader are obviously opposite to investors
who submit middle-size orders, confirming the lower volatility associated with intensified
margin-trading found in the previous sections.
Finally, we regress future returns on trades from different investor groups to examine
whether the buy/sell by large/middle/small investors contain private information. Panel D
of table 9 shows that on one-day horizon, middle-size sell-orders mistakenly predict future
returns whereas small-size sell-orders correctly predict future returns. Over one-week hori-
zon, large-size and middle-size sell orders mistakenly predict future returns. None of them
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are able to have any predictive power for returns longer than one-week. In comparison,
the trading behaviors by short-sellers correct predict future market returns, even in 20-day
horizon.
To sum up, it seems that Chinese short-sellers and margin-traders are quite special in-
vestor groups. Their trading patterns do not replicate the trading strategy by any typical
large/middle/small investor groups. It seems more likely that they trade opposite to the
dominating power in the market who submit middle-size bids, leading to lower volatility as
we observed in Tables 3 and 5. On ex-post basis, investors submitting middle-size bids are
not able to correctly predict future returns; short-sellers, however, can.
6.3. Portfolio insurance
The increase in short-selling is likely to be driven by increased scale of principal-guaranteed
fund. We obtain the share of funds categorized as “principal-guaranteed” from WIND. In
Figure 2, we plot the aggregated fund share in billion RMB by month in gray bars. In
addition, we plot the aggregated monthly short-selling volume in million RMB in solid line,
and the aggregated margin-trading volume by 10 million RMB in dashed line. It is quite
obvious that the margin-trading volume show a clear upward trend, whereas the increase
in short-selling is relatively depressed, especially in 2012. The policy support tilted toward
margin-trading in the refinancing pilot scheme beginning from August 2012 partially con-
tributes to such a trend. Unreported results indicate that the correlation between short
volume and fund shares is as high as 90%, and the correlation between margin volume and
the share of principal-guaranteed fund is only 45%. Hence, it is likely that one potential
motivation for short-selling is replicate the portfolio insurance. If funds are rebalanced on
daily basis or on program-trading basis, managers adjust stock positions in response to con-
temporaneous stock return by buying winners and selling losers. This is inconsistent with
the evidence we observed in Table 6. Therefore, although portfolio insurance exercised by
guaranteed fund is a potential motivation for short-selling, it is not a dominating one.
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6.4. Learning curve
An emerging market arguably has abundant profitable opportunities at the initiation
of an influential reform. Through a learning process, others investors can mimic some of
the trading strategies adopted by short-sellers and margin-traders. Hence, if a substantial
proportion of short-seller’s profit come from skills that can be learned and mimicked, we
expect to observe less predicative power by short-sellers in the more recent period. If short-
seller’s profit comes from very sophisticated skills or private information produced with high
cost, we will not see too much changes in the short-seller’s predicative power during this
learning process.
We perform subsample analysis of return predictability and report the results in Table
10. Comparisons between panels A and B reveal that the predictive power by covering of
short positions remain quite strong even in the recent subsample period. Actually, when
we compare Table 10 to Table 7, the predicative power by short-selling is more pronounced
with the recent subsample, suggesting that the trading strategy by short-sellers are not
easy to mimic. Short-seller’s profits are likely driven by very sophisticated skills or private
information.
6.5. Margin-traders: profitable liquidity provision?
As revealed in Table 6, margin-trades buy in case of strong sell-order imbalance and cover
the margin positions in subsided sell-order imbalance, although they also cover the margin
positions in subsided buy-order imbalance. We next explore whether this liquidity provision
by margin-traders in sell-order imbalance is profitable. In unreported results, we regress the
buy-/sell-order imbalance on the margin-trading turnover and covering turnover on day t−1,
controlling for the average buy-/sell-order imbalance in the previous five trading days. We
find that intensified margin-trading activities tend to be followed by even stronger sell-order
imbalance and weaker buy-order imbalance. Such results remain robust after we change
regressors to the average margin-trading turnover and covering turnover in the past five
trading days. In addition, the order imbalance is quite persistent; the correlation between
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order imbalance on day t and the average order imbalance in the previous five days is 0.20,
significantly positive. These results suggest that if margin-traders buy to provide liquidity,
this strategy is unprofitable as the sell-order imbalance does not fade out immediately.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of short-selling and margin-trading in the Chinese
market from various perspectives. First, we examine the impact of bans on short-selling
and margin-trading and find negative event returns when the bans are lifted. Second, we
find higher price efficiency and lower volatility after the bans are lifted. Third, we find that
intensified short-selling is associated with higher efficiency, whereas both intensified short-
selling and margin-trading are associated with lower volatility. Fourth, we find intensified
short-selling in response to higher contemporaneous return and following lower historical
return, suggesting that they trade against temporal overpricing in an established downward
trend. Return predictability tests reveal that the trades by short-sellers are able to predict
future returns. Our results suggest that short-sellers are informed traders. Furthermore,
short-sellers and margin-traders are not market destabilizers. By trading opposite to other
investors groups, short-selling and margin-trading effectively reduces return volatility.
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns around additions
This figure plots the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns around addition
events. The horizontal axis shows the event time in trading days relative to the addition
event. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the
designated list and therefore can be sold short or purchased on margin from the event day.
The vertical axis shows the daily abnormal returns in bars and the cumulative abnormal
returns in lines. The abnormal return is the daily return minus the expected returns by
the OLS market model. To estimate the market model, we apply an estimation window of
[−396,−31] in calendar days relative to the announcement day, with a minimum length of
180 trading days.
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Figure 2: The scale of principal-guaranteed fund
This figure plots the book value of principal-guaranteed fund (in trillion RMB) in gray bar
along the calendar time. It also plots the monthly trading volume of short-selling (in million
RMB) in solid line and the margin-trading volume (in 10 million RMB) in dashed line.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: List changes, addition and deletion events
This table reports statistics on the occurrence of events in which the bans on short-selling
and margin-trading are lifted for a subset of Chinese stocks. We do not count ETF in this
table. “Effective day” (yyyy/mm/dd) is the day on which a (revised) list of designated
securities eligible for short-selling and margin-trading takes effect. “Announcement day”
(yyyy/mm/dd) is the day on which the (revised) list is announced. The remaining columns
show the number of stocks added to or deleted from the designated list and the number of
stocks remaining on the list.
Effective day Announcement day No. added No. deleted No. on list
2010/03/31 2010/02/12 90 - 90
2010/07/01 2010/06/21 5 5 90
2010/07/29 2010/07/16 1 1 90
2011/12/05 2011/11/25 189 1 278
Cumulated 285 7 278
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Table 2: Stock returns around additions
This table reports the cross-sectional average of (cumulated) abnormal returns along event
time in trading days. An addition event is defined as one in which a stock is added to
the designated list and therefore can be sold short or purchased on margin from the event
day. The abnormal return is the raw return minus the market-model predicted return. In
estimating the market model, we apply an estimation window of [−396,−31] in calendar
days relative to the announcement day, with a minimum length of 180 trading days. Panels
A and B report statistics for the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns,
respectively.
Event trading day No. Obs. Average return t-value
Panel A: Daily abnormal returns around additions
-5 260 -0.19% -2.42
-4 271 -0.04% -0.57
-3 272 -0.05% -0.53
-2 272 -0.21% -2.27
-1 272 -0.23% -2.95
0 274 -0.47% -4.46
1 274 0.17% 2.13
2 274 -0.09% -1.15
3 274 -0.04% -0.52
4 274 -0.10% -1.14
5 274 -0.32% -3.21
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around additions
[−5,−1] 272 -0.71% -3.70
[−1,+1] 274 -0.53% -3.13
[0,+2] 274 -0.39% -2.34
[0,+5] 274 -0.85% -3.54
[0,+10] 274 -1.59% -3.97
[0,+20] 274 -3.60% -6.06
[0,+40] 274 -3.15% -5.20
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Table 3: Changes in efficiency and return distribution around additions
This table reports the changes around addition events. In an addition event, an individual
stock is added to the designated list and therefore can be sold short or purchased on margin
from the event day. Column “Pre” shows the cross-sectional average of variables during the
pre-event estimation window of [-56,-5] weeks relative to the addition event, and column
“Post” shows the average in the post-event window of [5,56] weeks. We require a minimum
of 36 weeks in the pre- and post-event windows to estimate the variables or to calculate
the time-series average of variables, and a minimum of 16 weeks for variables conditional
on signed returns. We apply the paired t-test to examine the statistical significance of the
change in cross-sectional mean around the additions. In Panel A, we winsorize stock returns
at two standard deviations around the mean. We estimate the OLS market model in the
pre- and post-event estimation windows for each addition event and report statistics on β
and R2. We also estimate market models conditional on positive (negative) market returns.
ρ is the cross-autocorrelation between stock returns and the lagged market returns, and
ρ+ (ρ−) is estimated conditional on positive (negative) lagged market returns. In Panel
B, Volatility , Skew , and Kurt are the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of weekly
returns. V ol− (V ol+) is the standard deviation of the minimum (maximum) of weekly returns
and zero. Extreme− (Extreme+) is the fraction of weekly returns lower (higher) than two
standard deviations below (above) the mean. We do not winsorize returns to calculate return
distribution measures in Panel B. Reported measures are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile.
N Pre Post t-Ttest
Panel A: Change in efficiency
β 276 1.19 1.27 4.78***
β− 273 1.16 1.35 4.65***
β+ 278 1.30 1.29 0.24
R2 276 48.2% 48.7% 0.51
R2− 273 30.7% 28.0% 3.73***
R2+ 278 27.0% 24.9% 0.89
|ρ| 276 10.6% 9.1% 2.63***
|ρ−| 276 23.1% 14.5% 8.52***
|ρ+| 278 13.8% 12.3% 1.89*
|V R| 275 0.21 0.18 2.48***
Panel B: Change in return distribution
Ret 275 0.08% 0.20% -1.98*
Volatility 275 5.9% 4.9% 12.17***
−Vol− 274 3.4% 2.9% 6.94***
−Vol+ 274 3.5% 2.8% 16.65***
Skew 275 0.13 0.26 2.59**
Kurt 274 1.04 0.99 0.31
Extreme− 275 3.1% 1.2% 11.53***
Extreme+ 274 3.5% 2.3% 5.35***
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Table 4: Summary statistics for short-selling and margin-trading activities
This table reports the summary statistics for daily short-selling and margin-trading activities.
Average daily short volume (covering volume of short positions), in shares, is the cross-
sectional average of the time-series average of the number of shares sold short (returned
to cover the short positions) on each day for a given stock. Average daily short turnover
(covering turnover of short positions) is the short (covering) volume scaled by daily trading
volume. Average daily margin-trading volume (turnover) and covering volume (turnover) of
margin positions are defined in a similar way.
2010 2011 2012
No. of eligible stocks 96 278 278
Average daily short volume 4,468 61,560 130,841
Average daily short turnover 0.01% 0.59% 0.73%
Average daily covering volume of short positions 4,429 58,214 130,358
Average daily covering turnover of short positions 0.01% 0.55% 0.74%
Average daily margin purchase volume 306,647 509,981 930,217
Average daily margin purchase turnover 0.78% 3.58% 5.15%
Average daily covering volume of margin positions 246,174 401,271 858,115
Average daily covering turnover of margin positions 0.62% 2.36% 4.64%
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Table 5: Impact on efficiency and volatility
This table reports the results of regressing efficiency and return distribution measures on short-
selling and margin-trading turnovers, using stock-year panel data. In panel A, we winsorize stock
returns at two standard deviations around the mean. R2− (R2+) is the R-square of the market model
by regressing weekly returns on contemporaneous market returns in a stock-year, conditional on
negative (positive) market returns. |ρ−| (|ρ+|) is the absolute value of the cross-autocorrelation
between weekly returns and lagged market returns in a stock-year, conditional on negative (positive)
lagged market returns. |V R| is the variance ratio, defined as the absolute value of the variance of
monthly returns divided by four times the variance of weekly returns, minus one, in a stock-year. In
Panel B, we do not winsorize stock returns. V ol− (V ol+) is the standard deviation of the minimum
(maximum) of weekly returns and zero in a stock-year. Extreme− (Extreme−+) is the fraction
of weekly returns lower (higher) than two standard deviations below (above) the mean in a stock-
year. Skew is the skewness of weekly returns in a stock-year. Short, CoverShort, Margin, and
CoverMargin are daily short turnover, covering turnover of short positions, margin turnover, and
covering turnover of margin positions, averaged to stock-year level. Control variables unreported
for brevity include log firm size, yearly turnover ratio, dummy variables for dual-listed A-H stocks
and A-B stocks. We winsorize variables at 1 and 99 percentile. The standard errors are clustered
by year and stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis under the coefficients. ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Impact on efficiency
R2− R
2
+ |ρ−| |ρ+| |V R|
Short -4.688** 0.074 -2.334 -2.237** -1.407
(2.18) (0.04) (0.82) (2.01) (0.76)
CoverShort -37.661 0.111 5.734 -32.202*** 8.911
(1.43) (0.01) (0.47) (9.96) (0.92)
Margin -1.500 0.134 -0.998** -0.969* -1.376*
(1.32) (0.20) (2.50) (1.73) (1.82)
CoverMargin 3.913** 4.613*** -0.577 0.322* -2.521
(2.45) (3.44) (0.21) (1.70) (1.06)
N 457 457 457 457 457
R2 − adj 14.5% 2.0% 16.1% 15.0% 9.5%
Panel B: Impact on return distributions
V ol− V ol+ Extreme− Extreme+ Skew
Short 0.066 0.195 -0.021 -0.060 -6.198
(0.91) (1.63) (0.24) (0.43) (1.63)
CoverShort -4.160*** -4.310*** -2.725* 1.725 64.102
(3.12) (5.19) (1.65) (1.24) (0.97)
Margin -0.096*** -0.070* -0.132** -0.014 1.400
(2.76) (1.78) (2.23) (0.64) (1.34)
CoverMargin 0.033 -0.123 -0.224*** -0.192 0.783
(0.61) (1.46) (5.08) (1.11) (0.86)
N 457 457 456 456 457
R2 − adj 42.4% 30.8% 6.9% -0.3% 1.5%
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Table 6: Determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities
This table reports the results of regressing daily short-selling turnover (Short), covering
turnover of short positions (CoverShort), margin-trading turnover (Margin), and covering
turnover of margin positions (CoverMargin) on past returns and other determinants using
panel data. The turnovers are the respective trading volume in shares scaled by the daily
total trading volume ×100. r−5,−1 is the cumulative return for a stock in the past five trading
days. rt is the contemporaneous stock return. spreadt is the volume-weighted effective spread
on day t. oimbt is contemporaneous daily stock-level order imbalance, which is volume of
buys minus sells scaled by the total volume of buys plus sells. We follow the buy and sell signs
identified by GTA. oimb− equals |oimb| if oimb ≤ 0 and zero otherwise, and oimb+ equals
oimb if oimb ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. σt is daily high price minus low scaled by high. Other
control variables not reported for brevity include the lagged dependent variable, the average
share turnover in the past five trading days, the average sell- and buy-order imbalance in
the past five trading days, the average σ in the past five trading days, log firm size, and
book-to-market ratio. In columns (2) and (4), we control for the lagged short turnover and
margin turnover, respectively. We winsorize variables at 1 and 99 percentile. The standard
errors are clustered by calendar date and stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis
under the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Shortt Cover
Short
t Margint Cover
Margin
t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r−5,−1 -0.304*** -0.241*** -0.066 0.103
(3.87) (3.17) (0.26) (0.39)
rt 0.868*** -1.296*** -5.676*** -1.644*
(3.19) (5.15) (6.27) (1.94)
Spreadt 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.007** 0.003
(3.60) (4.40) (2.14) (1.08)
oimb−t -0.371*** -0.231*** 1.065*** -0.770***
(8.14) (4.99) (4.57) (3.48)
oimb+t 0.011 -0.199*** -1.640*** -0.740***
(0.23) (4.29) (9.80) (4.30)
σt 2.432*** 1.351*** -14.313*** -7.555***
(5.47) (3.58) (10.58) (5.70)
TV−5,−1 -0.002*** -0.001** 0.000 -0.001
(4.05) (2.32) (0.19) (0.92)
N 65,369 65,339 65,369 65,360
R2 − adj 52.3% 57.1% 46.4% 50.9%
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Table 7: Predicting future returns
This table reports results of regressing future returns on short-selling and margin-trading activities
using panel data. The dependent variable is the stock level (cumulative) abnormal returns on day
t + 2, from trading days 2 to 5, 2 to 10, or 2 to 20. The abnormal return is raw return adjusted
by the market-model, which is estimated in a rolling window of [−280,−31] trading days. Short,
CoverShort, Margin, and CoverMargin are the respective short-selling turnover, covering turnover
of short positions, margin-trading turnover, and covering turnover of margin positions. Turnovers
are the respective trading volume in shares scaled by the daily total trading volume. r−5,−1 is
the cumulative return for a stock in the past five trading days. rt is the contemporaneous stock
return. spreadt is the time-weighted bid-ask spread on day t. oimbt is contemporaneous daily order
imbalance of a stock, which is volume of buys minus sells scaled by the total volume of buys plus
sells. We follow the buy and sell signs identified by GTA. oimb− equals |oimb| if oimb ≤ 0 and
zero otherwise, and oimb+ equals oimb if oimb ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. σt is daily high price minus
low price scaled by high price. Other control variables unreported for brevity include the average
share turnover in the past five trading days, log firm size, and book-to-market ratio. The standard
errors are clustered by calendar date and stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis under
the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR+2 CAR+2,+5 CAR+2,+10 CAR+2,+20
Shortt -0.022* -0.045* -0.033 -0.013
(1.75) (1.72) (0.79) (0.18)
CoverShortt 0.050*** 0.141*** 0.222*** 0.284***
(3.64) (5.80) (4.73) (3.70)
Margint -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010
(1.58) (0.95) (0.78) (0.50)
CoverMargint 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(1.00) (0.14) (0.04) (0.08)
r−5,−1 -0.131 -0.915 -1.943* -4.632***
(0.76) (1.49) (1.77) (3.14)
rt 0.695 1.385 0.849 -2.715
(1.51) (1.19) (0.47) (1.37)
Spreadt 0.001 0.007** 0.013* 0.021
(0.77) (2.17) (1.88) (1.63)
oimb−t 0.122 0.200 -0.154 -0.443
(1.31) (1.04) (0.50) (0.90)
oimb+t -0.376*** -0.826*** -1.164*** -1.563**
(3.41) (3.35) (3.15) (2.57)
σt 2.661*** 6.371*** 8.003** 13.424***
(3.94) (3.42) (2.47) (2.64)
N 52,349 52,349 52,349 52,349
R2 − adj 0.21% 0.46% 0.52% 0.52%
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Table 8: Potential trading motivations: Technical analysis
This table reports the results of regressing daily short-selling and margin-trading turnovers
on technical indicators using panel data. In Panel A, we rank stocks by the cumulative
returns in the past five trading days (r−5,−1), and dummy loser−5 ,−1 (winner−5 ,−1 ) equals
one for stocks in the bottom (top) quintile and zero otherwise. Dummy downMA−1 (up
MA
−1 )
equals one if the closing price on day t − 1 goes down (up) and crosses over the past 20
trading day’s moving average from above (below) and zero otherwise. Dummy downTRB−1
(upTRB−1 ) equals one if the closing price on day t − 1 goes down (up) and breaks through
the trading range of the past 250-trading day’s minimum (maximum) and zero otherwise.
In panel B, we redefine technical indicators based on the contemporaneous stock return
(rt). Control variables unreported for brevity include the lagged dependent variable, the
contemporaneous bid-ask spread, sell/buy order imbalance, σ, and the historical average
turnover ratio, sell/buy order imbalance, σ in the past five trading days, log firm size, and
book-to-market ratio. In columns (2) and (4), we control for the lagged short turnover and
margin turnover, respectively. We winsorize variables at 1 and 99 percentile. The standard
errors are clustered by calendar date and stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis
under the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Shortt Cover
Short
t Margint Cover
Margin
t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Regressing on past technical indicators
loser−5,−1 0.021*** 0.014** 0.043 0.040
(3.03) (2.22) (1.52) (1.45)
winner−5,−1 0.000 0.002 0.027 0.035
(0.06) (0.31) (1.03) (1.22)
downMA−1 0.072*** 0.043*** -0.086 -0.097**
(4.29) (3.17) (1.29) (1.98)
upMA−1 -0.094*** -0.069*** -0.067 -0.034
(7.45) (5.47) (1.30) (0.70)
downTRB−1 0.042** 0.023 -0.158*** -0.073
(2.14) (1.48) (2.72) (1.17)
upTRB−1 -0.109*** -0.063* -0.203 -0.136
(3.14) (1.71) (1.57) (1.51)
rt 1.423*** -1.034*** -8.106*** -2.048**
(5.19) (4.01) (7.96) (2.56)
N 65,945 65,915 65,945 65,936
R2 − adj 51.9% 56.9% 45.4% 50.8%
Panel B: Regressing on contemporaneous technical indicators
r−5,−1 -0.326*** -0.259*** 0.221 0.175
(4.23) (3.40) (0.82) (0.66)
losert -0.057*** 0.012** 0.179*** -0.196***
(7.03) (1.99) (5.13) (6.40)
winnert 0.192*** 0.025*** -0.568*** -0.193***
(15.28) (2.73) (13.51) (6.35)
downMAt -0.031*** 0.015 0.049 0.021
(2.88) (1.31) (0.71) (0.35)
upMAt -0.014 -0.060*** -0.216*** -0.009
(0.81) (3.81) (3.97) (0.18)
downTRBt 0.064*** -0.004 -0.204*** 0.009
(3.74) (0.27) (3.37) (0.13)
upTRBt -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.095 -0.168**
(5.33) (3.40) (0.78) (1.98)
N 65,945 65,915 65,945 65,936
R2 − adj 52.7% 56.9% 45.6% 50.8%
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Table 9: Identity of short-sellers and margin-traders
Based on transaction data, we label trade records with average dollar volume greater than or
equal to RMB 50,000 as “large”, those with average dollar volume greater than or equal to
RMB 10,000 but less than RMB 50,000 as “middle”, and those with average dollar volume
less than 10,000 as “small” (Ng and Wu, 2007). We follow the buy or sell signs identified
by GTA. Panel A shows the distribution of the number and dollar volume of trades as-
signed to groups. Panel B reports the results of regressing the excel buy and sell by different
groups on the past return (r−5,−1) and contemporaneous return rt. Control variables un-
reported for brevity include past order imbalance oimb−5,−1, bid-ask spread spreadt, daily
volatility σt, past turnover tv−5,−1, firm size, and book-to-market ratio. Panel C reports the
results of regressing daily short-selling turnover (Shortt), covering turnover of short positions
(CoverShortt ), margin-trading turnover (Margint), and covering turnover of margin positions
(CoverMargint ) on the contemporaneous excess buy or sell from different groups. Control vari-
ables unreported for brevity include the lagged dependent variables. Panel D reports the
results of regressing future (cumulative) abnormal return on excess buy or sell from differ-
ent groups. Control variables unreported for brevity include r−5,−1, rt, σt, and tv−5,−1. We
winsorize variables at 1 and 99 percentile. The standard errors are clustered by calendar
date and by stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis under the coefficients. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Large Middle Small
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Summary statistics by different investor groups
No. of trades (×106) 1.384 1.357 14.494 13.874 6.185 6.147
3.2% 3.1% 33.4% 31.9% 14.2% 14.2%
Value of trades (×1012) 1.263 1.238 3.069 2.954 0.387 0.381
13.6% 13.3% 33.0% 31.8% 4.2% 4.1%
Panel B: Regress excess-buy or sell by investor groups on past and contemporaneous returns
r−5,−1 -0.032* 0.004 0.014 0.022** -0.001 0.025***
(1.88) (0.25) (1.02) (1.98) (0.12) (2.63)
rt -0.173*** 0.037 0.276** -0.044 -0.063 0.030
(3.26) (0.81) (2.45) (0.41) (0.97) (0.43)
Panel C: Regress short-selling/margin-trading on excess buy/sell
Shortt 0.034 0.126*** 0.561*** -0.244*** 0.064 -0.018
(0.73) (2.64) (6.84) (3.86) (0.70) (0.24)
CoverShortt 0.056 0.084** -0.112* -0.098** 0.047 -0.038
(1.50) (2.04) (1.74) (1.98) (0.59) (0.49)
Margint 0.276 -0.018 -2.379*** 0.677** -0.092 -0.016
(1.38) (0.11) (8.87) (2.55) (0.27) (0.05)
CoverMargint 0.011 0.201 -0.518*** -1.206*** -0.246 -0.133
(0.05) (1.05) (2.65) (4.12) (0.68) (0.35)
Panel D: Regress future return on excess buy/sells
CAR+2 0.029 0.114 -0.270 0.482*** -0.246 -0.505***
(0.30) (1.15) (1.61) (3.02) (1.30) (3.01)
CAR+2,+5 0.012 0.438* -0.303 0.635** 0.130 -0.259
(0.05) (1.87) (0.79) (2.11) (0.26) (0.67)
CAR+2,+10 -0.082 0.467 -0.073 0.516 -0.028 -0.734
(0.25) (1.47) (0.13) (1.19) (0.04) (1.27)
CAR+2,+20 -0.432 -0.008 0.288 1.015 -0.459 0.662
(0.90) (0.02) (0.34) (1.24) (0.37) (0.65)
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Table 10: Subsample analysis
We divide the whole sample period to two subsamples: an early period from March 2010 to June
2011, and a recent period from July 2011 to December 2012. We regressing future returns on
short-selling and margin-trading activities using panel data. The dependent variable is the stock
level (cumulative) abnormal returns on day t + 2, from trading days 2 to 5, 2 to 10, or 2 to
20. The abnormal return is raw return adjusted by the market-model, which is estimated in a
rolling window of [−280,−31] trading days. Short, CoverShort, Margin, and CoverMargin are the
respective short-selling turnover, covering turnover of short positions, margin-trading turnover, and
covering turnover of margin positions. Turnovers are the respective trading volume in shares scaled
by the daily total trading volume. Control variables unreported for brevity include the cumulative
stock return in the past five trading days, the contemporaneous return, the contemporaneous
effective spread, the contemporaneous buy- and sell-order imbalance, volatility, the average share
turnover in the past five trading days, log firm size and book-to-market ratio. The standard errors
are clustered by calendar date and stock. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis under the
coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR+2 CAR+2,+5 CAR+2,+10 CAR+2,+20
Panel A: The early subperiod: March 2010 - June 30, 2011
Shortt -0.076 -0.020 -0.126 0.036
(1.42) (0.17) (0.71) (0.10)
CoverShortt 0.139** 0.261*** 0.575*** 0.508*
(2.27) (2.85) (3.78) (1.91)
Margint 0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.054
(0.40) (0.19) (0.19) (1.11)
CoverMargint -0.006 -0.017 -0.012 -0.048
(1.12) (1.20) (0.47) (0.99)
N 22,250 22,250 22,250 22,250
R2 − adj 0.36% 0.67% 0.81% 0.82%
Panel B: The recent subperiod: July 2011 to December 2012
Shortt -0.022* -0.053** -0.035 -0.018
(1.69) (1.99) (0.90) (0.26)
CoverShortt 0.044*** 0.134*** 0.204*** 0.287***
(3.18) (5.31) (4.25) (3.74)
Margint -0.004* -0.008 -0.013 -0.023
(1.88) (1.28) (1.01) (0.96)
CoverMargint 0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.003
(1.27) (0.03) (0.14) (0.12)
N 30,099 30,099 30,099 30,099
R2 − adj 0.14% 0.48% 0.44% 0.43%
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